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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of corporate governance attributes of
listed Egyptian companies on the propensity (adoption) and comprehensiveness (quality) of corporate
internet reporting (CIR) practices.
Design/methodology/approach – This study uses archival data from the largest (top) 100 listed
companies on the Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX 100). Corporate governance attributes are captured
by ownership structure (free float, managerial ownership, government ownership) and board of
directors’ structure (board size, board independence, CEO-chair duality). Empirical models are used to
estimate the effects of these attributes on the propensity, content, presentation, and overall
comprehensiveness of CIR.
Findings – The results of this study indicate mixed effects of governance attributes on the choice to
adopt CIR and its quality. The results from the Binary Logistic Regression suggest that Egyptian
companies with greater (less) ownership dispersion, managerial ownership, governmental ownership,
and (board independence) are more likely to adopt CIR. On the other hand – and as revealed by the
seemingly unrelated regressions – among CIR companies those with greater (less) ownership
dispersion, board size (governmental ownership), and (board independence) have more comprehensive
CIR.
Originality/value – This study extends the relatively limited research on the effects of corporate
governance and CIR in emerging markets. The study contributes to this literature by demonstrating
how corporate governance attributes affects the choice to adopt CIR disclosure practices and the level
of its quality in an emerging market such as Egypt.
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1. Introduction
The recent developments in the field of information and communication technology
have profoundly altered the ways corporate information is disseminated among
stakeholders. Specifically the accounting function had to adapt to new
information media such as the internet (Bonson and Escobar, 2006). Chan and

Wickramasinghe (2006) argue that corporate internet reporting (CIR) is advantageous
for several reasons. First, CIR saves costs associated with paper-based reporting and
facilitates frequent updating of information. Second, CIR allows wider dissemination of
information than does paper-based reporting. Finally, CIR facilitates more efficient
transfer and integration of information for better decision making.
Despite the prevalence of CIR practices they are usually voluntary and unregulated
(Dutta and Bose, 2007). The resulting lack of standardization of CIR has attracted
many researchers to examine the firm specific determinants of the use and quality of
CIR. The majority of CIR studies have been conducted in developed countries like the
USA (Deller et al., 1999; Lymer, 1999; Ettredge et al., 2001; Debreceny et al., 2002;
Oyelere et al., 2003; Lodhia et al., 2004). However, there are also several studies that are
based on companies operating in developing countries (Dutta and Bose, 2007;
Ezzat, 2008; Ezzat and El-Masry, 2008).
The quality of traditional financial reporting is a function of the strength of
governance mechanisms and the effectiveness of securities legislation and government
monitoring (Samaha and Dahawy, 2011). Disentangling the roles of these two factors is
challenging due to the mandatory nature of traditional financial reporting. On the other
hand, the voluntary nature of CIR provides a natural setting, in which legal
requirements are neutralized, and thus the “true” effects of governance mechanisms on
the quality of corporate reporting could be effectively examined.
Recent empirical work examining the association between corporate governance
mechanisms and CIR disclosures has primarily focused on developed countries
(Abdelsalam and Street, 2007; Abdelsalam and El-Masry, 2008) rather than emerging
capital markets. Egypt is a rapidly emerging market targeted by foreign investors
(Samaha and Stapleton, 2009; HassabElnaby et al., 2009). Ezzat and El-Masry (2008)
argue that Egypt has witnessed several economic and regulatory changes over the last
several years such as the extensive privatization of the public sector, reform of the
regulatory framework governing businesses, and the increase in internet usage.
Accordingly, the demand for higher quality corporate information has increased.
In addition, Egypt has been adopting more effective policies of corporate governance,
disclosure, and transparency with the objective of enhancing the quality of corporate
information and in turn the stimulation of the Egyptian economy (Samaha et al., 2009;
Samaha and Stapleton, 2009; Samaha and Dahawy, 2010).
Recent research in the Egyptian setting (Aly et al., 2009; Desoky, 2009) have focused
on the relationship between firm characteristics and the level of CIR disclosure, but the
effect of corporate governance mechanisms was absent in these studies. Therefore, this
study seeks to extend this research by exploring the propensity and comprehensiveness
of CIR disclosures by the top 100 listed Egyptian companies and further investigating
the impact of several corporate governance mechanisms on the propensity and
comprehensiveness of CIR. The study capture corporate governance attributes by
ownership structure (free float, block ownership, managerial ownership,
and government ownership) and board of directors’ structure (board size, board
independence, and CEO-chair duality).
Results show that ownership structure variables (free float, managerial ownership,
and government ownership) are positively related to CIR propensity. The results
suggest that less effective monitoring via dispersed ownership leads to greater
propensity to adopt CIR. Greater managerial ownership and government ownership
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also lead to greater propensity to adopt CIR. In addition the negative relation
between board independence and CIR propensity, although weak, does indicate a
substitutive effect.
On the other hand it was found that free float is positively related to CIR
comprehensiveness and its content and presentation dimensions. This could be
explained by the demand of higher “quality” CIR disclosures communicating necessary
corporate information to the small equity holding investors, who would lack resources
or incentive to participate in monitoring the management actions. In contrast, the
negative associations between government ownership and CIR comprehensiveness,
content and presentation indicates a substitutive relation. It was also found that
companies with larger boards have greater CIR comprehensiveness via better content
and presentation. Finally board independence is negatively related to the overall CIR
comprehensiveness indicating substitutive effect.
The paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it provides direct evidence
regarding the effects of corporate governance characteristics of Egyptian companies
on the propensity, content, presentation, and overall comprehensiveness of CIR.
Second, it uses a comprehensive checklist of 87 attributes as a proxy for CIR quality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature
review and hypotheses development. Section 3 provides a description of the
measurement and research design. Section 4 presents the empirical results of this
study. Finally, Section 5 gives a summary of the main findings of this study, its
limitations and opportunities for future research.
2. Literature review and hypotheses development
Separating ownership and control leads to various agency costs (Jensen and Meckling,
1976) which in turn affects the value of the firm (Hutchinson et al., 2008). Accordingly,
agency contracts encompassing numerous forms of governance mechanisms are used
to align the interests of principals (owners) and agents (managers) in an attempt to
mitigate the agency problem (Fama and Jensen, 1983).
Researchers, regulators and international bodies have defined corporate governance
in several ways. For example, the Cadbury Committee Report (1992) defines corporate
governance as “the system by which companies are directed and controlled”. Shleifer
and Vishny (1997) define corporate governance as:
[. . .] the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a
return on their investment. How do the suppliers of finance get managers to return some of
the profits to them? How do they make sure that managers do not steal the capital they
supply or invest it in bad projects? How do suppliers of finance control managers?

Finally, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2004)
Principles of Corporate Governance describes governance as:
[. . .] a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and
other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through which
the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and
monitoring performance are determined.

The OECD guidelines were a primary source for drafting the Egyptian Code of
Corporate Governance in 2005 and that was updated in 2011 which is a collection
of guidelines and standards of best practice for Egyptian companies. However, many

of the code’s recommendations are adopted and mandated by other regulatory bodies
such as the Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX) and the Egyptian Financial Supervisory
Authority. Despite slight differences among the definitions and the approaches to
corporate governance, one would agree that the four pillars of corporate governance
are fairness, accountability, responsibility, and transparency/disclosure. This paper
focuses on the latter pillar. More specifically the focus is on a unique form of disclosure
used by Egyptian companies which is CIR.
There are several streams of corporate governance research. The majority of
corporate governance papers focus on the effects of corporate governance on the quality
of “traditional” financial reporting. Such quality was proxied by a variety of measures
such as the abnormal accruals (Klein, 2002), fraud (Beasley, 1996; Farber, 2005), Tobin’s
Q (Morck et al., 1988), and accounting conservatism (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007),
analysts’ recommendations (Yu, 2011). Another stream of research focuses on the
functioning of monitoring mechanisms (e.g. auditors) within a corporate governance
regulatory framework such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Chan et al., 2009).
Finally, a recent stream of corporate governance research examines the role of
governance mechanisms within the context of a new form of financial reporting which
is CIR (Abdelsalam et al., 2007; Abdelsalam and El-Masry, 2008; Kelton and Yang,
2008; Ezat and El-Masry, 2008; Desoky and Mousa, 2009). This study extends the latter
stream of research by examining the various governance mechanisms’ effects on the
propensity and comprehensiveness of CIR in Egypt.
It is argued that the manner in which governance, proxied by the various
characteristics, affects the propensity and comprehensiveness of CIR depends on
whether the governance-CIR relation is substitutive or complementary. This is
consistent with Kelton and Yang (2008) and Samaha (2010) who argue that a negative
association between “strong” governance and more and/or better CIR implies a reduced
level of information asymmetry and in turn a reduced demand for disclosure suggesting
a substitutive relation. Conversely a positive association implies that corporate
governance deters managers from withholding information manifested in greater
disclosure suggesting a complementary relation. The authors examine these relations
within the Egyptian context while focusing on two sets of governance characteristics:
(1) the ownership structure; and
(2) board of directors’ structure of the company.
2.1 Ownership structure
2.1.1 Free float. Free float is a direct proxy of ownership diffusion which in turn is a
source of conflict of interest and information asymmetry ( Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Disclosure is a tool used to mitigate such agency problems. Prior studies have found
that ownership diffusion is positively related to CIR (Pirchegger and Wagenhofer,
1999; Marston and Polei, 2004; Bollen et al., 2006; Momany and Al-Shorman, 2006).
Such result suggests that companies use CIR to provide a widely dispersed shareholder
base with information thus facilitating more effective monitoring of management.
Prior studies based on Egyptian companies documented a positive association between
free float and the timeliness of CIR (Ezat and El-Masry, 2008).
The 2009 Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) in Egypt issued
by The World Bank (2009) highlighted the lower monitoring role of minority
shareholders in Egypt. In light of this, ownership dispersion (proxied by free float)
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H1b. Free float is positively associated with the comprehensiveness of CIR.
2.1.2 Managerial ownership. The separation between ownership and control leads to
an array of agency problems which are all based on the premise that managers are
homoeconomicus (economically self-interested). Based on agency theory, one way to
mitigate this problem is to align the interests of managers with those of shareholders
by increasing the level of managerial ownership (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
However, effects of managerial ownership on corporate governance are non-linear.
High levels of managerial ownership could result in entrenchment which in turn would
weaken corporate governance (Morck et al., 1988; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1997; Gul and
Wah, 2002).
While results from Abdelsalam et al. (2007) and Kelton and Yang (2008) did not find
a significant managerial ownership impact on CIR, Abdelsalam and El-Masry (2008)
document a positive relation between the CEO ownership and the extent of
internet-based disclosures. These mixed results led to the development of the following
non-directional hypotheses:
H2a. Managerial ownership is associated with the propensity of CIR.
H2b. Managerial ownership is associated with the comprehensiveness of CIR.
2.1.3 Government ownership. Eng and Mak (2003) argue that government-owned
companies exhibit higher levels of agency costs because of the inherent potential
inconsistencies between the objectives of profit maximization of the firm and the
nation-wide objectives. Such a setting requires more disclosure. However, Gahazali and
Weetman (2006) argue that government ownership, and thus monitoring, acts as a
substitute to disclosure. In addition, the results of Xiao et al. (2004) based on a sample
of Chinese companies suggest that greater government ownership is associated with
lower CIR quality. They attribute this to state owners lacking interest to entice public
disclosure resulting from their ability to obtain private information. Accordingly,
fewer disclosures are directed to the public. Based on this evidence the following
hypotheses were developed:
H3a. Government ownership is negatively associated with the propensity of CIR.
H3b. Government ownership is negatively associated with the comprehensiveness
of CIR.
2.2 Board of directors’ structure
2.2.1 Board size. The board of directors is an important tool used to monitor
managerial actions (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Healy and Palepu, 2001). Davidson et al.
(2005) highlights market perspectives of the role of the board in terms the ensuring
validity and soundness of accounting choices made by management (see for example,
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards
Committee, 2002).

The number of directors serving on a company’s board could be a determinant of
monitoring effectiveness. A large number of directors, arguably, will reduce the
management opportunistic behavior, such that it would be less likely to withhold
information to their own benefit. However, there is empirical evidence that suggests
that smaller boards are more effective monitors of managerial practices than larger
ones. For example, Yermack (1996) found that US companies with larger boards
exhibit lower Tobin’s Qs. This phenomenon was also documented by Andrés
Alonso et al. (2005) who used an international sample. The latter study concludes that
coordination, communication, and flexibility problems seem to be outweighing any
potential benefits of large boards. Within the context of CIR studies, Desoky and
Mousa (2009) found that companies with larger board size are more likely to provide
on-line disclosures. Accordingly the following hypotheses were developed:
H4a. Board size is positively associated with the propensity of CIR.
H4b. Board size is positively associated with the comprehensiveness of CIR.
2.2.2 Board independence. Board independence enhances the board’s effectiveness as a
governance mechanism. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the independence posture
of non-executive directors reduces complacency of the board in mitigating managerial
opportunism. In addition non-executives have reputational capital that is only
preserved and enhanced by more effective monitoring of companies which they serve
on the boards.
There is pervasive empirical evidence on the role of board of directors in promoting
financial reporting quality. For example, Ahmed and Duellman (2007) found a direct
relation between the proportion on independent directors serving on the board and
accounting conservatism. Another stream of research documents a negative relation
between board independence and earnings management, proxied by abnormal
accruals (Klein, 2002; Peasnell et al., 2005). Finally studies such as Beasley (1996),
Dechow et al. (1996), and Farber (2005) document a negative association between board
independence and the likelihood of financial statement fraud.
Based on the above evidence it is clear that there is a consensus regarding the
effectiveness of independent boards as monitors of the financial reporting process.
A similar consensus is found within the context of CIR literature, as Abdelsalam et al.’s
(2007), Kelton and Yang’s (2008) and Desoky and Mousa’s (2009) empirical results
show that the board independence is positively related with the CIR disclosures. Thus,
the following hypotheses were developed:
H5a. Board independence is positively associated with the propensity of CIR.
H5b. Board independence is positively associated with the comprehensiveness of
CIR.
2.2.3 CEO-chair duality. Prior studies have found that in cases where the CEO assumes
the position of chairman of the board, governance is impeded to some extent. Fama and
Jensen (1983) and Messier (2000) argue that the separation between the CEO and
chairman of the board (i.e. lack of CEO-Chair duality) is conducive to better monitoring.
Empirical research has shown that duality increases the likelihood of SEC enforcement
actions (Dechow et al., 1996) and increases the extent of earnings management
(Davison III et al., 2004). In addition auditors view duality as a governance weakness
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which results in a higher level of control risk. This argument is supported by Tsui et al.
(2001) who document a positive relation between duality and audit fees.
In the context of CIR studies, Abdelsalam et al. (2007) and Ezat and El-Masry (2008)
did not find any significant effect of duality on the timeliness of CIR for Irish companies
and Egyptian companies, respectively. In addition, Kelton and Yang (2008) did not
report any significant association between CEO-duality and CIR practices for NASDAQ
listed companies. Thus, the following non-directional hypotheses were developed:
H6a. CEO-chair duality is associated with the propensity of CIR.
H6b. CEO-chair duality is associated with the comprehensiveness of CIR.
3. Measurement and research design
This section outlines the sample selection procedure, the measurement of the
dependent variables of CIR propensity and comprehensiveness dimensions, the
measurement of the independent variables of corporate governance attributes, firm
characteristics, and finally the formulation of the estimation models.
3.1 Sample and data sources
The sample is based on the top 100 Egyptian companies (EGX 100) listed in the
Egyptian Exchange (EGX), which combines the constituents of the other two main
indices of the exchange, EGX 30 and EGX 70. One would expect that companies in
such sample are more likely to adopt CIR than other listed companies. This might be
because of the larger size, more active trading, stronger investor relation culture, and
greater resources.
The sample company names were obtained from the Egyptian Company for
Information Dissemination (EGID). To determine their internet presence, searches
using common search engines were made. Using this approach, only 69 companies web
sites were located, out of which three web sites were not established yet (under
construction), and one web site was not currently in use (under revision). Four affiliated
sample companies had a web existence only by means of their relative holding
companies web sites (Table I). To ensure a minimum degree of temporal differences,
the 61 sample companies accessible web sites were examined over a short period of
time (one month as of January 2009), during which the under construction/revision web
sites were frequently checked for accessibility.
Data for the relevant independent variables were collected from a range of sources
including the EGX website and publications, the EGID, Reuter’s data base, and
print-based annual reports. All sample companies related data were collected as of
December 2008.
Sample companies (EGX 100)
Companies with no identified web site

Table I.
Sample companies’ web
sites analysis

Affiliated companies (subsidiaries)
Companies with web sites under construction
Companies with currently not in use web sites
Companies with an accessible web site

100
(31)
69
(4)
(3)
(1)
61

3.2 Dependent variables measurement
3.2.1 The propensity of CIR – adoption. Consistent with Oyelere et al. (2003), who focus
on New Zealand, this study classifies companies of the EGX 100 into two groups:
(1) companies with an accessible established web site (61 companies); and
(2) companies with no web site (39 companies).
The second group includes the sample companies for which a web address cannot be
identified (31 companies), the affiliated companies that have not yet established their
own web presence (four companies) as well as companies with under
construction/revision web site (four companies). The dependent variable PROP takes
a value of 1 if a company belongs to CIR group and zero if a company belongs to the
non-corporate internet reporting companies (NCIR) group.
3.2.2 The comprehensiveness, content, and presentation of CIR – quality. From an
extensive review of CIR measures used by prior studies in different countries – such
as Bangladesh (Dutta and Bose, 2007), China (Xiao et al., 2004), Greece (Spanos and
Mylonakis. 2007), the USA (Kelton and Yang, 2008), Eastern Europe (Bonson and
Escobar, 2006), and Egypt (Aly et al., 2009) – the authors developed an extensive
CIR comprehensiveness checklist of 87 items categorized into content and
presentation measures. The developed checklist includes the measures identified
by prior CIR literature as relevant investor information and/or important CIR
attributes. In comparison with prior studies, the checklist can be considered as a
comprehensive instrument that yields rich CIR assessment. It is worth mentioning
that except for a few studies (Marston and Polei, 2004; Xiao et al., 2004; Abdelsalam
et al., 2007; Aly et al., 2009) the literature is thin on studies that analyzed content and
presentation measures.
The CIR comprehensiveness checklist consists of two partial indices: first, content
with 67 items and second, presentation comprising 20 items. Content refers to what is
disclosed on the web, while presentation is more related to how the information is
disclosed. Based on the work of Spanos and Mylonakis (2007) and Dutta and Bose
(2007) our content measures are classified into four sub-groups: financial attributes
(30 items), corporate governance attributes (19 items), social and environmental
attributes (ten items) and investor relations’ attributes (eight items). Financial
attributes sub index examines the disclosure of company-related accounting and
financial information. The paper-based disclosure of such information is mandatory
for listed Egyptian companies; however, using the internet as an alternative
disclosure media depends completely on a listed company’s choice. Corporate
governance sub index reviews the on-line availability of certain corporate governance
items drawn from extant literature and the Egyptian corporate governance code
guidelines. The social and environmental sub index analyzes the extent a sample
company provides certain social and environmental items on the web, while investor
relations attributes sub index measures the degree that useful relevant investor
information is provided on-line.
The other partial index measures (presentation measures) are classified into two
sub-groups; one group addresses the specifics of web site design (eight items) forming
technological features sub index. Where, the second group examines how easier to
navigate the site and locate information, and this group encompasses 12 items
represented in the accessibility sub index. Classifying the checklist measures into
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sub-groups provides the chance of gaining insight on the levels in different CIR
components and dimensions from the sample companies, which in turn adds to the
value of the checklist as an assessment instrument. Figure 1 shows the checklist items
composition of the overall index and its distribution among the different partial and
sub-indices. In addition Table III shows the frequency of the items within the internet
reporting companies (CIR) sample.
Equal weights were assigned for all checklist items, assuming equal importance of
items to all different user groups. For each CIR company, the aggregate scores for
indices are calculated based on the existence (assigned value of 1) or absence (assigned
value of 0) of the checklist items described above. Unweighted scoring is adopted, as
assigning different weights to the checklist items would contain an element of
subjectivity that cannot be totally avoided (Marston and Polei, 2004). For only one
presentation measure (loading time of the web site , 10 seconds) scoring is
determined on a subjective basis.
Each index is calculated by expressing the aggregate score on each index as a
percentage of the total number of items comprising the calculated index. The
dependent variables content (C-CONTENT), presentation (C-PRESENT), and overall
comprehensiveness (C-OVERALL) are the percentage scores based on 67, 20, and
87 total number of items, respectively. The consistency of the CIR comprehensiveness
measures is based on Cronbach’s coefficient a (Cronbach, 1951). A scale is considered

CIR Comprehensiveness Full Checklist
C-OVERALL (87 items)

Content Partial Index
C-CONTENT
(67 items)

Presentation Partial
Index
C-PRESENT (20 items)

Technological
Features Sub Index
(8 items)

Figure 1.
Internet reporting
comprehensiveness
checklist items
distribution

Financial
Reporting Sub
Index (30 items)

Corporate
Governance
Reporting Sub
Index (19 items)

Social and
Environmental
Reporting Sub Index
(10 items)

Accessibility
Sub Index
(12 items)

Investor
Relation Sub
Index (8 items)

reliable with a value of 0.7 (Nunnaly, 1978). For C-CONTENT, C-PRESENT and
C-OVERALL the Cronbach’s coefficient a are 0.91, 0.88, and 0.97, respectively,
suggesting scale reliability and the measurement validity of the dependent variable.
3.3 Measurement of corporate governance test variables and control variables
Based on the hypotheses the variables of interest capture the governance attributes of
ownership structure and board structure. Ownership structure is captured by
(FFLOAT) measured as the percentage of shares held by individual (retail) investors,
managerial ownership (MAN) measured as percentage of shares held by management
directors, and government ownership (GOV) measured as the percentage of shares held
by government institutions and/or public sector companies. Board structure is
captured by board size (BOARD) measured as the number of board members, board
independence (INDIR) measured as the percentage of board members who are
non-executive directors, and CEO-chair duality (DUAL) which is a dichotomous
variable that is equal to 1 if the company’s CEO serves the board chairman and 0
otherwise.
Consistent with prior studies (Abdelsalam et al., 2007; Kelton and Yang, 2008; Khlif
and Soiussi, 2010; Samaha et al., 2011), the authors controlled for some firm
characteristics such as size, leverage, profitability, industry sector, type of auditor, and
internationality. They control for size since larger firms tend to have higher agency
costs and political costs as well; voluntary disclosure (on the internet) could be a
possible way to reduce such costs (Debreceny et al., 2002; Marston and Polei, 2004;
Bonson and Escobar, 2006). They also measure firm size (FSIZE) by the natural
logarithm of the firm’s market value of equity (i.e. market capitalization).
Leverage is included in the control variables because as debt increases, company
managers will increase the level of disclosed information in an attempt to aid creditors’
assessments of the company’s creditworthiness. Leverage (LEV) is measured by the
ratio of long term debt to total stock holders equity. On the basis of signalling theory,
managers of high performing companies are motivated to disclose more information
than less profitable ones. Managers of profitable firms are more inclined to disclose
information as justification of their compensation contracts to improve shareholder
confidence (Kelton and Yang, 2008). Prabowo and Angkoso (2006) and Aly et al. (2009)
reported a positive association between CIR and profitability. Return on equity,
calculated as the ratio of net income before tax to total stockholders’ equity, was used
to measure profitability (PROF).
Prior literature (Oyelere et al., 2003; Xiao et al., 2004; Bonson and Escobar, 2002, 2006;
Abdelsalam et al., 2007) found industry type to be a relevant factor in CIR choices. The
industry sector control (INDTYPE) is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the company
belongs to financial sector and 0 otherwise. Internationalization is becoming a trend of
large Egyptian companies in the form of foreign operations and/or access to foreign
capital. Bollen et al. (2006) argues that an “international” company would need a tool for
communicating its information to geographically dispersed parties (e.g. clients and
investors) with whom it deals.
The internet serves as this communication tool. Thus, internationalization is
considered a driver of CIR practices. Accordingly the authors measured the
internationality control variable by two dichotomous variables; foreign sales
(FORSALE) and foreign listing (FORLIST) which equal to 1 if the company has
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foreign sales and a foreign listing, respectively, zero otherwise. Finally, a positive
association between CIR and audit firm type was supported by prior studies. Thus, the
authors also control for the type of audit firm (AUDTYPE) by using a dichotomous
variable which equals 1 the auditor is a Big4 firm, and 0 otherwise.
3.4 Estimation models
To test the hypotheses, the authors ran two main sets of estimation models. First, the
binary logistic regression was used to test the relations between the variables of interest
and the dichotomous dependent variable (PROP). Second, the seemingly unrelated
regression (SUR) is used for the continuous dependent variables (C-CONTENT,
C-PRESENT, and C-OVERALL). SUR is appropriate because of the correlations
between the continuous variables and because the error terms are assumed to be
correlated across the equations (Der and Everitt, 2008).
The following models are estimated:
PROP ¼ b0 þ b1 FFLOAT þ b2 MAN þ b3 GOV þ b4 BOARD þ b5 INDIR
þ b6 DUAL þ b7 FSIZE þ b8 LEV þ b9 PROF þ b10 INDTYPE
þ b11 FORSALE þ b12 FORLIST þ b13 AUDTYPE þ 1
C 2 CONTENT ¼ a0 þ a1 FFLOAT þ a2 MAN þ a3 GOV þ a4 BOARD
þ a5 INDIR þ a6 DUAL þ a7 FSIZE þ a8 LEV þ a9 PROF
þ a10 INDTYPE þ a11 FORSALE þ a12 FORLIST
þ a13 AUDTYPE þ 1
C 2 PRESENT ¼ d0 þ d1 FFLOAT þ d2 MAN þ d3 GOV þ d4 BOARD
þ d5 INDIR þ d6 DUAL þ d7 FSIZE þ d8 LEV þ d9 PROF
þ d10 INDTYPE þ d11 FORSALE þ d12 FORLIST
þ d13 AUDTYPE þ 1
C 2 OVERALL ¼ l0 þ l1 FFLOAT þ l2 MAN þ l3 GOV þ l4 BOARD
þ l5 INDIR þ l6 DUAL þ l7 FSIZE þ l8 LEV þ l9 PROF
þ l10 INDTYPE þ l11 FORSALE þ l12 FORLIST
þ l13 AUDTYPE þ 1
where PROP is the propensity of CIR which is equal to 1 for CIR companies and zero
for NCIR companies, C-CONTENT is the CIR content partial index score, C-PRESENT
is the CIR presentation partial index score, and C-OVERALL is the CIR
comprehensiveness overall score. The definitions and measurement of the dependent
variables are described in Section 3.2 while those of the variables of interest and control
variables are described in Section 3.3. Finally 1 is the error term.
4. Empirical results and discussion
4.1 Descriptive results
Table II – panel A shows the descriptive statistics regarding the ownership structure
variables.
The average free float for the full sample is only 27 percent. Such a result suggests
high ownership concentration in Egyptian companies and accordingly implies that
major shareholders generally dominate the ownership structures of companies.

CIR (61 companies)

NCIR (39 companies)

Panel A. Descriptive statistics – ownership structure
Free float (FFLOAT)
Mean
0.3356
0.1789
Max.
0.90
0.46
Min.
0.03
0.01
SD
0.22661
0.10912
Managerial ownership (MAN)
Mean
0.1161
0.0850
Max.
0.52
0.98
Min.
0.00
0.00
SD
0.19243
0.18580
Government ownership (GOV)
Mean
0.2527
0.2045
Max.
0.96
0.92
Min.
0.00
0.00
SD
0.33873
0.28519
Panel B. Descriptive statistics – board of directors’ structure
Board size (BOARD)
Mean
11.1311
8.0256
Max.
31.00
17.00
Min.
3.00
3.00
SD
6.70193
4.10062
Board independence (INDIR)
Mean
0.0921
0.1167
Max.
0.54
0.62
Min.
0.00
0.00
SD
0.12364
0.15758
CEO-chair duality (DUAL)
Mean
0.6066
0.6410
Max.
1.00
1.00
Min.
0.00
0.00
SD
0.49257
0.48597
Panel C. Descriptive statistics – control variables
Untransformed firm size (SIZE)
Mean
3,000,000,000
900,000,000
Max.
30,000,000,000
10,000,000,000
Min.
10,000,000
10,000,000
SD
6,419,167,070
2,121,851,981
Profitability (PROF)
Mean
0.3327
0.0589
Max.
7.28
1.37
Min.
2 1.40
22.17
SD
1.06310
0.57334
Leverage (LEV)
Mean
1.5089
0.9608
Max.
19.51
14.89
Mini.
0.00
0.00
SD
3.87933
3.09708
Industry type (INDTYPE)
Mean
0.2295
0.0513

Full sample (EGX 100)

0.2745
0.90
0.01
0.20393
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0.1040
0.98
0.00
0.18954
0.2339
0.96
0.00
0.31830
9.92
31
3
5.99946
0.1017
0.62
0.00
0.13763
0.6263
1.00
0.00
0.48626
2,300,000,000
30,000,000,000
11,408,542
5,291,487,173
0.2259
7.28
22.17
0.91058
1.2952
19.51
0.00
3.58813
0.1600
(continued)

Table II.
Descriptive statistics of
the variables of interest
and control variables
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Table II.

CIR (61 companies)
Max.
Min.
SD
Foreign sales (FORSALE)
Mean
Max.
Min.
SD
Foreign listing (FORLIST)
Mean
Max.
Min.
SD
Audit firm (AUDTYPE)
Mean
Max.
Min.
SD

NCIR (39 companies)

Full sample (EGX 100)

1.00
0.00
0.42401

1.00
0.00
0.22346

1.00
0.00
0.36845

0.6721
1.00
0.00
0.47333

0.6667
1.00
0.00
0.47757

0.6700
1.00
0.00
0.47258

0.1475
1.00
0.00
0.35759

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.900
1.00
0.00
0.28762

0.4918
1.00
0.00
0.50408

0.1795
1.00
0.00
0.38878

0.3737
1.00
0.00
0.48626

Notes: FFLOAT is the free float measured as the percentage of shares held by individual (retail)
investors, MAN is the managerial ownership measured as percentage of shares held by management
directors, GOV is the government ownership measured as the percentage of shares held by
government institutions and/or public sector companies, BOARD is the board size measured as the
number of board members, INDIR is the board independence measured as the percentage of board
members who are non-executive directors, DUAL is CEO-chair duality which is a dichotomous
variable that is equal to 1 if the company’s CEO serves the board chairman and 0 otherwise; SIZE is the
firm’s market value of equity, LEV is leverage measured as the ratio of long term debt to total
stockholders’ equity, PROF is the return on equity measured as the ratio of net income before tax to
total stockholders’ equity to measure profitability, INDTYPE is industry type which is a dichotomous
variable that is equal to 1 if the company is a financial company and 0 otherwise, FORSALE is
internationality based on foreign sales which is a dichotomous variable that is equal to 1 if the
company has foreign sales and 0 otherwise, FORLIST is internationality based on foreign listing
which is a dichotomous variable that is equal to 1 if the company has a foreign listing and 0 otherwise,
AUDTYPE is the audit firm type which is a dichotomous variable that is equal to 1 if the auditor is Big
4 and 0 otherwise

Executive directors own approximately 10 percent of the companies stock, while on
average 23 percent of the equity shares are held by government/public sector
institutions. However, CIR companies have greater free float, managerial ownership,
and government ownership than NCIR.
Table II – panel B presents the descriptive statistics regarding the board structure
variables. The average board members number is ten while on average 10 percent of
the sample company BOD’s are non-executives. Approximately 63 percent of the
companies have CEOs who also act as board chairpersons. Sub-sample results suggest
than on average CIR companies have larger boards but slightly lower board
independence. CEO-chairman duality exists in around 61 percent of CIR companies.
Finally Table II – panel C shows the descriptive statistics for the control variables.
More than three quarters (84) of the sample companies are in the non-financial sector,
while only 16 companies operate in the financial services sector. The average return on

equity is 23 percent, indicating that the sample companies are financially sound. The
leverage mean value is 1.3, indicating that the sample companies rely substantially on
debt to finance their activities. On average 67 percent of the companies operate in
foreign markets. About 9 percent of the sample companies are listed on a foreign
exchange market. Only 37 percent of the sample companies engage a Big4 audit firm.
The results also suggest that on average CIR companies are larger and more profitable
than NCIR companies. Approximately 50 percent of the CIR companies are audited by
a Big4 audit firm while on the contrary non-Big4 audit firms are dominating the NCIR
companies market. It is also worth mentioning that all companies with foreign listings
are CIR companies.
The Appendix provides the detailed frequency results for the CIR
comprehensiveness checklist items. Some results are worth highlighting. The
CONTENT partial index and its four sub-indices Regarding “financial attributes”
shows that fewer than half of the CIR sample companies which are disclosing
mandatory financial statements include the balance sheet (44 and 49 percent), the
income statement (43 and 48 percent), the cash flow statement (39 and 44 percent), the
statement of changes in equity (38 and 43 percent) for the current and past year,
respectively. In addition, the auditor’s report is only reported by 36 percent of CIR
companies. An examination of the “corporate governance attributes” items reveals the
highest frequency was for profile description of the board members (52 percent) while
the lowest was for compensation of the members of the supervisory board (3 percent).
Concerning the “corporate, social and environmental attributes” 39 percent of CIR
companies report product quality and safety while only 10 percent provide a
stand-alone CSR report. Regarding the “investor relations attributes” the results give
insight that the sample companies are highly dedicated for establishing an English
version of its web site (93 percent).
From the C-PRESENT partial index and its two sub-indices shows that for
“technological features attributes” all CIR companies had web sites, which load in less
than 10 seconds indicating ease of accessing web sites. Finally for the “accessibility
attributes” 98 percent of the CIR companies have a click over menu.
Table III summarizes the CIR comprehensiveness descriptive results for the
61 companies. The mean scores of C-CONTENT, C-PRESENT, and C-OVERALL
are 33, 48, and 36 percent, respectively, indicating that the CIR disclosure provided by the
sample companies tends to be relatively limited. No single company scored 100 percent

CIR content (C-CONTENT)
Financial attributes
Corporate governance attributes
Social and environmental attributes
Investor relations attributes
CIR presentation (C-PRESENT)
Technological features
Accessibility
CIR comprehensiveness (C-OVERALL)

Mean

Max.

Min.

Range

SD

0.3266
0.3701
0.2308
0.2475
0.4352
0.4846
0.4484
0.5068
0.3642

0.96
1.00
0.95
1.00
1.00
0.94
1.00
0.85
0.92

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.15
0.13
0.08
0.05

0.96
1.00
0.95
1.00
1.00
0.79
0.87
0.77
0.87

0.31781
0.39266
0.24897
0.30089
0.35417
0.23951
0.29717
0.21291
0.29635

Propensity
of CIR in Egypt

155

Table III.
Descriptive statistics for
CIR comprehensiveness
partial and sub-indices
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of the checklist/partial indices items, highlighting room for improvement in the
Egyptian CIR practices.
The mean of C-PRESENT is higher than that of C-CONTENT suggesting that
companies in the sample focus more on the use of web information technological
advances in disclosing corporate information. Regarding the content sub-indices, the
sample companies performed best on investor relations attributes with a mean of
44 percent followed by the financial attributes with a mean of 37 percent. However, the
sample companies performed poorly on corporate governance and social and
environmental attributes with means of 23 and 25 percent, respectively. Regarding the
presentation sub-indices, on average the sample companies scored 51 percent on the
accessibility measures while they scored only 45 percent on the technological features
dimension.
4.2 Regression results
The results in Table IV – panel A suggests that while the correlations are significant
for some independent variables, they do not undermine the validity of the findings[1].
In addition the OLS regressions of all independent variables on C-CONTENT,
C-PRESENT, and C-OVERALL, yielded tolerance levels above 0.20 and variance
inflation factors below ten as shown in Table IV – panel B. Overall the results indicate
that multicollinearity does not undermine the validity of the results.
4.2.1 The effect of corporate governance on the propensity (adoption) of CIR: binary
logistic regression. Table V shows the results of the estimated binary logistic regression
for testing the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the propensity of CIR in
listed Egyptian companies. As suggested by the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit
statistic[2] (x 2 ¼ 8.261, df ¼ 8, p ¼ 0.408) the overall model fit is acceptable, assuring
the reliability of the logistic model results.
Results show that FFLOAT has a significant positive effect on PROP suggesting
that companies with greater ownership diffusion are more likely to adopt CIR. This
result is attributable to two factors. First, companies with more dispersed ownership
are more likely to use the internet to disseminate corporate information to stakeholders
(Pirchegger and Wagenhofer, 1999; Marston and Polei, 2004; Bollen et al., 2006;
Momany and Al-Shorman, 2006; Ezat and El-Masry, 2008). Second, ownership is
dispersed among small retail non-institutional investors in Egypt. Based on ROSC
(2009) such investors are unlikely to have the incentive and/or resources to effectively
monitor managers. Thus, it is argued that CIR adoption may be used to compensate for
such a deficiency. Overall the result supports H1a.
The positive relation between MAN and PROP supports H2a suggesting that
greater managerial ownership is associated with greater likelihood of adopting CIR
and is consistent with Abdelsalam and El-Masry (2008).
Moreover, government ownership GOV is shown to have a significant unexpected
(5 percent significance level, two-tailed) positive impact on the CIR choices implying
that with higher government equity holdings companies have greater incentives for
on-line disclosure adoption to enhance the information processing and
communication with the public. Such a result is inconsistent with H3a and the
results of Xiao et al. (2004). This inconsistency may be attributed to the high levels of
agency costs and potential lack of alignment between national objectives of state
owners and firm-level objectives of other shareholders (Eng and Mak, 2003).

FSIZE

1
0.109
0.139
0.116
0.006
0.471 * *
0.333 * *

variables
DUAL

1
20.221
0.019
0.016
2 0.138
0.033
2 0.058
20.114
1
0.134
0.436 * *
2 0.171
0.095
0.002

LEV

1
2 0.166
0.156
0.242
0.092

PROF

1
2 0.117
0.103
0.243
1
0.094
0.198

1
0.330 * *

1

INDTYPE FORSALE FORLIST AUDTYPE

Notes: * * and * indicate significance at the 0.01 level and the 0.05 level, respectively, (two-tailed); FFLOAT is the free float measured as the percentage of
shares held by individual (retail) investors, MAN is the managerial ownership measured as percentage of shares held by management directors, GOV is
the government ownership measured as the percentage of shares held by government institutions and/or public sector companies, BOARD is the board
size measured as the number of board members, INDIR is the board independence measured as the percentage of board members who are non-executive
directors, DUAL is CEO-chair duality which is a dichotomous variable that is equal to 1 if the company’s CEO serves the board chairman and 0 otherwise

Panel A. Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficients of the independent
FFLOAT
MAN
GOV
BOARD
INDIR
FFLOAT
1
MAN
20.133
1
2 0.153
1
GOV
2 0.253 *
BOARD
0.663 * * 2 0.121 2 0.174
1
0.011 2 0.138
0.432 * *
1
INDIR
0.289 *
2 0.229
DUAL
2 0.096
2 0.183
0.344 * * 2 0.137
FSIZE
0.355 * * 2 0.193
0.005
0.615 * * 2 0.245
0.243
LEV
0.050
20.032 20.079
0.294 *
PROF
0.065
2 0.178 2 0.108
0.249
0.021
*
*
*
*
0.083 2 0.269
0.376
0.195
INDTYPE
0.325
FORSALE
20.009
20.013 20.163
0.082
20.051
0.757 * *
0.289 *
FORLIST
0.760 * * 2 0.144 2 0.186
2 0.141 2 0.266 *
0.311 *
2 0.024
AUDTYPE
0.322 *
Panel B. Tolerance and variance inflation factor (VIF) statistics
Independent
Tolerance
VIF
variables
FFLOAT
0.316
3.169
MAN
0.846
1.182
GOV
0.684
1.461
BOARD
0.216
4.629
INDIR
0.724
1.381
DUAL
0.748
1.337
FSIZE
0.506
1.975
LEV
0.648
1.544
PROF
0.759
1.317
INDTYPE
0.474
2.111
FORSALE
0.834
1.199
FORLIST
0.242
4.129
AUDTYPE
0.690
1.449
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Multicollinearity
diagnostics tests: Pearson
correlation, tolerance and
variance inflation factor
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Variable
FFLOAT
MAN
GOV
BOARD
INDIR
DUAL
FSIZE
LEV
PROF
INDTYPE
FORSALE
FORLIST
AUDTYPE
Intercept
Model summary
Model (x2)
Cox and Snell R 2
n

Table V.
Binary logistic
regression results

Predicted sign
H1a
H2a
H3a
H4a
H5a
H6a

p
(p )
( )
(£)
(£)
(£)
(£)

þ
?
2
þ
þ
?
þ
þ
þ
?
þ
þ
þ
?
22 Log
likelihood
ratio ¼ 94.327
8.261 (df ¼ 8,
p ¼ 0.408)
0.326
100

Coefficient
estimate

SE

Wald statistic

4.118
2.545
1.988
20.096
23.256
20.225
1.130
0.023
0.695
1.152
0.058
19.174
0.469
210.101

2.289
1.517
0.995
0.080
2.100
0.587
0.477
0.094
0.461
1.239
0.555
11,878.716
0.654
3.793

3.237 * *
2.816 *
3.989††
1.412
2.403†
0.147
5.617 * * *
0.060
2.270 *
0.863
0.011
0.000
0.514
7.094 * * *

Notes: * * *, * *, * indicates significance at the , 0.01, , 0.05, and , 0.1 level, respectively,
(one-tailed where signs are predicted, two-tailed otherwise); ††, † p
indicates significance at the , 0.05
and ,0.15 levels, respectively, (two-tailed for unexpected signs); ( ) indicates that the corresponding
hypothesis is supported while ( £ ) indicates that the corresponding hypothesis is not supported;
PROP is CIR propensity which is a dichotomous that takes a value of 1 if a company uses CIR and
0 otherwise, FFLOAT is the free float measured as the percentage of shares held by individual (retail)
investors, MAN is the managerial ownership measured as percentage of shares held by management
directors, GOV is the government ownership measured as the percentage of shares held by
government institutions and/or public sector companies, BOARD is the board size measured as the
number of board members, INDIR is the board independence measured as the percentage of board
members who are non-executive directors, DUAL is CEO-chair duality which is a dichotomous
variable that is equal to 1 if the company’s CEO serves the board chairman and 0 otherwise; n ¼ 100;
dependent variable: CIR propensity (PROP)

In addition, the effect of government ownership on the choice of disclosure tools
might differ among countries.
Regarding the board of directors’ structure, the authors found a marginally
significant unexpected (15 percent significance level, two-tailed) negative relation
between INDIR and PROP which was contrary to H5a and prior literature
(Abdelsalam et al., 2007; Kelton and Yang, 2008; Desoky and Mousa, 2009). However,
this negative effect could be justified by a potential substitutive effect. In other words,
weaker boards in terms of independence are substituted by the use of CIR.
The coefficients of other board of directors’ structure attributes (size and duality)
were statistically insignificant and therefore H4a and H6a are not supported. Among
the controls firm size FSIZE and profitability PROF were positively related to CIR
propensity.

4.2.2 The effect of corporate governance on the comprehensiveness (quality) of CIR:
SUR. The SURs results provided in Tables VI-VIII indicate a statistically positive
coefficient of FFLOAT. This supports H1b in line with the results reported on H1a in
Table V, and with prior studies based on Australian samples (Pirchegger and
Wagenhofer, 1999), German samples (Marston and Polei, 2004), and international
samples (Bollen et al., 2006). This evidence suggests that ownership dispersion affects
both the choice to adopt CIR and its quality in terms of better content, presentation
and overall comprehensiveness. In other words, more dispersed ownership firms will
respond to investor decreased power in influencing management decisions with
increased disclosures via higher quality CIR, helping them monitor the management
behavior.
However, the statistically significant negative coefficients of GOV indicate that
greater government ownership is substituted by better CIR in terms of content,
presentation and overall comprehensiveness supporting H3b. Thus, while government
ownership plays an important role in monitoring the management behavior via
increasing the likelihood of adopting voluntary CIR as documented in Table V,
it substitutes its quality. This result is consistent with the results of Xiao et al. (2004)
Variable
FFLOAT
MAN
GOV
BOARD
INDIR
DUAL
FSIZE
LEV
PROF
INDTYPE
FORSALE
FORLIST
AUDTYPE
Intercept
F statistic
p-value
R2
Adjusted R 2
n

p

H1a ( )
H2b (p£ )
H3b (p)
H4b ( )
H5b ( £ )
H6b ( £ )

Predicted sign

Coefficient estimate

SE

t-value

þ
?
2
þ
þ
?
þ
þ
þ
?
þ
þ
þ
?
11.29
0.0001
0.7574
0.6903
61

0.808269
0.152255
20.15403
0.015406
20.05650
0.038883
0.094769
0.005995
0.010674
20.07746
0.017005
20.12554
0.055447
20.95036

0.182592
0.129530
0.081648
0.007361
0.218069
0.054250
0.044471
0.007345
0.024745
0.078581
0.053055
0.130299
0.054759
0.385343

4.43 * * *
1.18
2 1.89 *
2.09 * *
2 0.26
0.72
2.13 * *
0.82
0.43
2 0.99
0.32
2 0.96
1.01
2 2.47 * *

Notes: * * *, * *, * indicates significance at the , 0.01,
p , 0.05, and , 0.1 level, respectively, (one-tailed
where signs are predicted, two-tailed otherwise); ( ) indicates that the corresponding hypothesis is
supported while ( £ ) indicates that the corresponding hypothesis is not supported; C-CONTENT is
the content index based on 20 items FFLOAT is the free float measured as the percentage of shares
held by individual (retail) investors, MAN is the managerial ownership measured as percentage of
shares held by management directors, GOV is the government ownership measured as the percentage
of shares held by government institutions and/or public sector companies, BOARD is the board size
measured as the number of board members, INDIR is the board independence measured as the
percentage of board members who are non-executive directors, DUAL is CEO-chair duality which is a
dichotomous variable that is equal to 1 if the company’s CEO serves the board chairman and
0 otherwise
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Table VI.
Seemingly unrelated
regression results:
dependent variable: CIR
content (C-CONTENT)
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Table VII.
SUR results dependent
variable: CIR
presentation
(C-PRESENT)

Variable
FFLOAT
MAN
GOV
BOARD
INDIR
DUAL
FSIZE
LEV
PROF
INDTYPE
FORSALE
FORLIST
AUDTYPE
Intercept
F statistic
p-value
R2
Adjusted R 2
n

p
H1a ( )
H2b (p£ )
H3b (p)
H4b ( )
H5b ( £ )
H6b ( £ )

Predicted sign

Coefficient estimate

SE

t-value

þ
?
2
þ
þ
?
þ
þ
þ
?
þ
þ
þ
?
10.54
0.0001
0.7446
0.6739
61

0.532098
0.090296
20.13592
0.12790
20.13656
0.032449
0.088610
0.003866
0.002026
20.02155
0.005833
20.08176
0.003499
20.59009

0.140585
0.099731
0.062864
0.005668
0.167901
0.041769
0.034240
0.005655
0.019052
0.060503
0.040850
0.100323
0.042161
0.296692

3.78 * * *
0.91
2 2.16 * *
2.26 * *
2 0.81
0.78
2.59 * * *
0.68
0.11
2 0.36
0.14
2 0.81
0.08
2 1.99 * *

Notes: * * *, * *, * indicates significance at the ,0.01,
p ,0.05, and , 0.1 level, respectively, (one-tailed
where signs are predicted, two-tailed otherwise); ( ) indicates that the corresponding hypothesis is
supported while ( £ ) indicates that the corresponding hypothesis is not supported; C-PRESENT is the
presentation index based on 67 items, FFLOAT is the free float measured as the percentage of shares
held by individual (retail) investors, MAN is the managerial ownership measured as percentage of
shares held by management directors, GOV is the government ownership measured as the percentage
of shares held by government institutions and/or public sector companies, BOARD is the board size
measured as the number of board members, INDIR is the board independence measured as the
percentage of board members who are non-executive directors, DUAL is CEO-chair duality which is a
dichotomous variable that is equal to 1 if the company’s CEO serves the board chairman and
0 otherwise

in that state owners are not inclined to encourage public disclosure practices including
CIR. Thus, within the Egyptian context government ownership drives the adoption of
CIR but not its quality.
The coefficients of MAN were insignificant, a result that is consistent with
Abdelsalam et al. (2007) and Kelton and Yang (2008), but inconsistent with Abdelsalam
and El-Masry (2008). This means that H2b cannot be supported. Moreover, this result
together with the CIR propensity findings documented in Table V, suggests that while
MAN increases the likelihood of CIR adoption, it does not affect the quality of CIR
practices in Egyptian companies.
In terms of board of directors’ structure, the authors found a significant positive
relation between BOARD and the content, presentation, and overall CIR
comprehensiveness supporting H4b. This suggests that larger boards drive higher
levels of corporate transparency through better quality CIR practices. This finding is in
line with the results of Desoky and Mousa’s (2009) analysis of on-line disclosures by
Bahraini companies.
The marginally significant unexpected (15 percent, two-tailed) negative coefficient
of INDIR in the C-OVERALL model does not support H5b but is consistent with its

Variable
FFLOAT
MAN
GOV
BOARD
INDIR
DUAL
FSIZE
LEV
PROF
INDTYPE
FORSALE
FORLIST
AUDTYPE
Intercept
F statistic
p-value
R2
Adjusted R 2
n

p
H1a ( )
H2b (p£ )
H3b (p)
H4b ( )
H5b ( £ )
H6b ( £ )

Predicted sign

Coefficient estimate

SE

t-value

þ
?
2
þ
þ
?
þ
þ
þ
?
þ
þ
þ
?
12.67
0.0001
0.7780
0.7166
61

0.758869
0.143658
20.16108
0.014492
20.09043
0.043656
0.095958
0.006076
0.012140
20.07556
0.009152
20.11894
0.043161
20.88544

0.162526
0.115295
0.072675
0.006552
0.194104
0.048288
0.039584
0.006538
0.022025
0.069945
0.047225
0.115980
0.048741
0.342996

4.67 * * *
1.25
2 2.16 * *
2.21 * *
2 1.47†
0.090
2.42 * * *
0.93
0.55
2 1.08
0.19
2 1.03
0.89
2 2.58 * * *

Notes: * * *, * *, * indicates significance at the , 0.01, , 0.05, and , 0.1 level, respectively, (one-tailed
where signs are predicted,ptwo-tailed otherwise); † indicates significance at the ,0.15 level (two-tailed
for unexpected signs); ( ) indicates that the corresponding hypothesis is supported while ( £ )
indicates that the corresponding hypothesis is not supported; C-OVERALL is the overall
comprehensiveness index based on 87 items, FFLOAT is the free float measured as the percentage
of shares held by individual (retail) investors, MAN is the managerial ownership measured as
percentage of shares held by management directors, GOV is the government ownership measured as
the percentage of shares held by government institutions and/or public sector companies, BOARD is
the board size measured as the number of board members, INDIR is the board independence measured
as the percentage of board members who are non-executive directors, DUAL is CEO-chair duality
which is a dichotomous variable that is equal to 1 if the company’s CEO serves the board chairman
and 0 otherwise

substitutive relation with CIR propensity documented in Table V. It is worth noting
that this result is inconsistent with CIR prior research (Xiao et al., 2004;
Abdelsalam et al., 2007; Kelton and Yang, 2008; Desoky and Mousa, 2009), which
provided no evidence between independent directors’ proportion and CIR
comprehensiveness. This inconsistency may be attributed to differences in settings
and samples among the different studies.
The coefficient of DUAL continues to be insignificant in all CIR comprehensiveness
models, a result that is consistent with Abdelsalam and Street (2007), Kelton and Yang
(2008), Abdelsalam and El-Masry (2008) and Desoky and Mousa (2009). This finding
does not support H6b.
Regarding the control variables, only FSIZE was found to have a significant
positive correlation with the CIR content, presentation and overall comprehensiveness
level. This relation is significant at the 0.05 level or less for all models suggesting that
larger companies practice better CIR. The authors believe that the insignificant or
marginal significance of some of the coefficients could be attributed to the relativity
small sample sizes (100 and 61 observations).
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Table VIII.
SUR results dependent
variable: CIR overall
comprehensiveness
(C-OVERALL)
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5. Summary, conclusion and future research
This study extends prior CIR research by examining whether corporate governance
mechanisms affect a firm’s propensity to adopt CIR and the extent of its
comprehensiveness. The focus was on two sets of corporate governance attributes;
ownership structure and board of directors’ structure. The study provided practical
insight into the CIR disclosures by companies listed on EGX and highlights
a sustainable need for improvement in many CIR areas.
This study yields three sets of results. First, approximately 40 percent
(39 companies) of the constituents of EGX 100 – the main EGX index – do not
adopt CIR. Furthermore, among CIR adopting companies, variations were found in CIR
quality in terms of content, presentation and overall comprehensiveness. The results
also show that – on average – CIR adopting companies focus more on the presentation
dimension rather than the content aspect of CIR. This may indicate the need for more
regulatory intervention to streamline CIR practices in Egypt.
Second, a positive relation was found between ownership structure (free float,
managerial ownership, government ownership) and the propensity of CIR. However,
although weak, a negative relation between board independence and CIR propensity
was found. Such results suggest that free float, managerial ownership and government
ownership are drivers of CIR adoption. But stronger boards reduce the demand for CIR
adoption.
Third, the study shows that free float is positively related to CIR comprehensiveness
and its content and presentation dimensions. This could be explained by the demand of
higher “quality” CIR disclosures to communicate necessary corporate information to the
small equity holding investors, who may not be very effective monitors of management.
Furthermore, negative associations between government ownership and CIR
comprehensiveness, content and presentation were found thus supporting the original
hypothesis of a substitutive relation. Thus, it is argued, in line with Xiao et al. (2004) that
state owners are not inclined to encourage public disclosure practices including CIR.
Thus, within the Egyptian context government ownership drives the adoption of CIR
but not its quality.
We also show that companies with larger boards have greater CIR
comprehensiveness via better content and presentation. The higher the number of
board members the more likely a company will disclose more comprehensive CIR,
indicating that board size-CIR inter correlation is complementary. Finally, board
independence is weakly negatively related to the overall CIR comprehensiveness
suggesting a substitutive effect.
This study provides empirical evidence on the role of corporate governance
mechanisms with regard to the propensity to adopt CIR and the extent of its
comprehensiveness by Egyptian companies. Such evidence would provide guidance to
regulators on how to encourage Egyptian companies towards more disclosure on their
websites. The study further indicates the presence of differences in results between
studies conducted in developed versus developing nations. As with any other study this
one is subject to certain limitations. First, the study is based on a sample of the largest
(top listed) companies on the EGX. Thus, there results may not be generalizable to
smaller companies. Second, the use of an un-weighted checklist to capture CIR
comprehensiveness within a short-period window (one month) might be regarded

as a limitation when compared with an extended period of time. Such limitations could
be addressed by future research.
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Notes
1. A bivariate correlation above 0.8 would be problematic (Field, 2009).
2. A Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic greater than 0.05 is indicative of good model fit (Cox, 1970;
Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989).
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Appendix

Frequency
A. Content
A-1. Financial attributes
1. Balance sheet of current year
2. Income statement of current year
3. Cash flow statement of current year
4. Statement of changes in equity of current year
5. Interim statements of current year
6. Notes to financial statements for current year
7. Auditor’s report of current year
8. Full annual report of current year
9. Balance sheet of past year
10. Income statement of past year
11. Cash flow statement of past year
12. Statement of changes in equity of past year
13. Interim statements of past year
14. Notes to financial statements of past year
15. Auditor’s report of past year
16. Archive full annual reports one year
17. Archive full annual reports two year
18. Archive full annual reports more than two years
19. Summary of key ratios over a period of at least five years
20. Projected (pro-forma) financial statements and forecasts
21. Segmental reporting by line of business in current year
22. Segmental reporting by line of business in past years (at least, the last two years)
23. Current share price
24. Share price history
25. Share price performance in relation to stock market index
26. Current dividend
27. Dividend of past year
28. Assessments of analysts (reports of analysts)
29. Listing of analysts following the firm
30. Press releases/news about the company in informative media
A-2. Corporate governance attributes
31. Shareholder structure (composition)
32. Number of shares
33. Classes of shares
34. Current year resolutions of shareholders’ meeting
35. Speeches of the management board during the AGM
36. Current year resolutions of the board of directors
37. Current resolutions of the supervisory board
38. Past year resolutions of shareholders’ meeting
39. Past year resolutions of the board of directors
40. Past resolutions of the supervisory board
41. Corporate governance principles/guidelines
42. Code of conduct and ethics for directors, officers and employees
43. Members of the board of directors (CV)

27
26
24
23
22
24
22
23
30
29
27
26
20
23
22
26
24
19
20
5
7
7
16
17
17
24
26
5
13
35

%

44
43
39
38
36
39
36
38
49
48
44
43
33
38
36
43
39
31
33
8
11
11
26
28
28
39
43
8
21
57

27
44
24
39
3
5
11
18
22
36
21
34
4
7
9
15
13
21
4
7
14
23
15
25
32
52
(continued)
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Table AI.

Frequency
44. Members of the audit committee (CV)
45. Compensation of the members of the management board
46. Compensation of the members of the supervisory board
47. Information about directors dealing
48. Articles of association
49. Disclosure of risks
A-3. Corporate social and environmental attributes
50. Special CSR page
51. Stand-alone CSR report
52. Environmental policy statement
53. Information on energy savings
54. Employee/social/safety or health report
55. Employee profile
56. Employee training
57. Donations/sponsoring to community groups and charitable bodies information
58. Commercial sponsoring
59. Product quality and safety
A-4. Investor relations attributes
60. Name of investor relations officer
61. E-mail to investor relations
62. Phone number to investor relations
63. Postal address to investor relations
64. English version of web site
65. English version of annual reports
66. Frequently asked questions
67. Financial calendar: calendar of events of interests to investors
B. Presentation
B-1. Technological features attributes
68. Loading time of the web site ,10 seconds
69. Annual report in PDF format
70. Annual report in HTML format
71. Financial data in processable format
72. Hyperlinks inside the annual report to accounting data
73. Video files
74. Audio files
75. The use of graphics images:, e.g. share price graphs
B-2. Accessibility (convenience and usability) attributes
76. Page divided into frames
77. One-click link to investor relations page/information
78. One-click link to press releases/news
79. Clear boundaries between the annual report (audited) and other information
80. On-line investor information order service: possibility of ordering companyrelated information
81. Change to printing friendly format possible
82. Pull-down menu
83. Click over menu
84. Next/previous buttons to navigate sequentially
85. Mailing list/e-mail news alert
86. Internal search engine
87. Availability of help section

%

10
3
2
18
5
11

16
5
3
30
8
18

13
6
11
8
15
11
10
15
7
24

21
10
18
13
25
18
16
25
11
39

16
20
19
14
57
28
13
29

26
33
31
23
93
46
21
48

61
30
6
31
27
6
11
29

100
49
10
51
44
10
18
48

58
38
38
28

95
62
62
46

14
58
27
60
1
9
24
4

23
95
44
98
20
15
39
7

